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CROSS-BORDER CANADA/U.S. COOPERATION IN
INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
DebraA. Valentine*

Today I look forward to discussing cooperation between the United
States and Canadian enforcement agencies in both competition and consumer
protection matters. The agency I represent has a unique combined
jurisdiction over both consumer protection and competition issues that
enables us to promote consumer welfare throughout the economy. We protect
consumers and enhance competition in two primary ways - by eliminating
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the marketing of goods and services
and by ensuring that markets function competitively. Today we can do so
successfully only by working cooperatively with our foreign counterparts.
I. THE BACKDROP:
A. A GLOBAL ECONOMY MAKES COOPERATION CRITICAL
U.S.-Canadian cooperation in antitrust and consumer protection
enforcement is best understood in the context of four striking trends that have
emerged during the last decade. First is the dramatic increase in cross-border
trade and investment as tariff and non-tariff barriers have fallen, industries
have deregulated, technologies have converged and, fueled largely by
innovation, transportation and communication networks have improved. In
the United States alone, exports have doubled as a percentage of gross
domestic products to approximately twelve percent of GDP. Similarly, our
imports have increased by fifty percent to over fifteen percent of GDP.
Second, and directly connected to that increased global trade, is the
unprecedented level of merger activity, which rose to $4.3 trillion worldwide
in 1999. In the United States, the number of mergers reported to the antitrust
agencies more than tripled over the past decade, from 1,529 transactions in
1991 to 4,642 in 1999. Even more striking is the eleven-fold increase in
value of these transactions, from $164 billion in 1991 to $1.85 trillion in
1999.
* Valentine bio. The views expressed here are those of the author, and not necessarily of
the Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner.
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Third is the advent of the Internet as a boundary-less space for transacting
business. Use of the Internet has grown exponentially since commercial
browsers first became available in 1994 - 123 million Americans now have
access to the Net. Internet purchasing also is skyrocketing, forecasted to rise
from twenty billion dollars in 1999 to 184 billion dollars in 2004.
Fourth is the proliferation of national competition and, to a lesser degree,
consumer protection regimes. A decade ago, approximately twenty countries
were enforcing competition laws. Today, over eighty countries have an
antitrust law, and at least twenty more are considering draft legislation.
Approximately sixty of these laws contain merger control provisions. On the
consumer protection front, central and eastern European countries are
adopting consumer protection laws as they seek to join the European Union.
The convergence of this extraordinary growth in cross-border trade and
investment with growing numbers of national competition and consumer
protection laws designed to keep markets open and to insure that consumers
receive accurate information means that more and more sovereign
jurisdictions have the authority to review more and more transnational
business activity. For legitimate businesses, there is a clear potential for
heightened uncertainty and increased transaction costs when confronted with
multiple authorities reviewing their acquisitions and conduct. Today, fully
one-half of the mergers that the FTC decides to further investigate through
our so-called second request process involve a foreign dimension - such as a
foreign-based party, important evidence located abroad, or a foreign asset
critical to the remedy. Indeed, we notified foreign governments in thirteen of
the twenty-eight merger cases in which we took enforcement action last year.
I firmly believe that the best way to address the reality that business today is
global in scope, whereas laws are national, is for the enforcers to cooperate
so as to ensure, when competitive or deceptive practices problems do arise,
that enforcement is effective, outcomes are consistent, and remedies are
compatible to the extent possible.
Unfortunately for consumers, illegitimate business and consumer fraud
also have an increasing international component. Scammers are an inventive
lot - quick to try to avoid an authority's jurisdiction by targeting consumers
in countries other than where they locate themselves; quick to tailor their
scams to the differing interests of consumers in different countries; and quick
to move on to new scams according to what works. Here too, my prescription
is the same - at the center of an effective law enforcement strategy in the
international arena is the interplay between information sharing, enforcement
coordination, and the convergence of national laws. Effective information
sharing informs law enforcement coordination and makes it better. What
information can be shared depends on the relevant national laws, and
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national laws that limit information sharing necessarily limit cooperation and
the benefits that flow from it. All three elements warrant careful
consideration. The experiences of the United States and Canada respecting
these elements are informative of what works and what needs to be done.
II. THE U.S.-CANADA COOPERATION AGREEMENT
What are the United States and the Canadians doing to cooperate in
antitrust and consumer protection matters? Our cooperation is founded on a
1995 bilateral agreement that is similar to antitrust cooperation agreements
that we have with six other countries - Australia, Brazil, the E.C., Germany,
Israel, and Japan. It is unique in that the agreement also covers deceptive
marketing practices Interestingly, virtually all the basic obligations (which
are common to our other existing bilateral competition cooperation
agreements as well), apply in both the competition and consumer protection
spheres.
The first obligation is notification. Each party must notify the other about
enforcement activities that affect the other's important interests. Thus, the
FTC would notify Canada when we are investigating activities that are: (1)
relevant to its enforcement activities; (2) involve anticompetitive activities or
deceptive practices originating or carried out in its territory; (3) involve a
merger in which a party is incorporated or organized under the laws of
Canada; (4) involve conduct that Canada required, encouraged, or approved;
or (5) involve remedies that would require or prohibit conduct in Canada.
The next obligation is enforcement cooperation. The parties recognize
their common interest in cooperating: (1) to detect anticompetitive activities
or deceptive marketing practices; (2) to enforce their competition laws; and
(3) to share information and locate evidence, to the extent legally possible
and compatible with each country's interests.
The third obligation is coordination. The parties commit to consider
coordinating their enforcement activities when both are investigating either
related potentially anticompetitive activities or deceptive marketing practices
that have a transborder dimension. In deciding whether to coordinate
investigations, the officials consider various factors - such as each country's
ability to obtain needed information, to secure effective relief, to reduce costs
by coordinating, and to achieve its enforcement objectives.
Fourth is the avoidance of conflicts. Each party commits to give careful
consideration to the other's important interests and to minimize any adverse
1

Agreement Between The Government of The United States of America and The

Government of Canada Regarding The Application of Their Competition and Deceptive
Marketing Practices Laws, signed August 3, 1995.
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effects that its enforcement activities might have on the other's important
interests.
The fifth obligation is to consult. The agreement gives each party the
right to request consultations to resolve mutual or unilateral concerns about
any matter relating to the cooperation agreement. We also commit to semiannual meetings. It is easy to forget the personal element in creating a culture
of cooperation, but to some extent trust and respect are only achieved
through personal interaction. Annual or semi-annual consultations provide
this opportunity and make subsequent telephone, telefax, and e-mail
communications more informed and efficient.
The sixth obligation is confidentiality. The parties commit to maintain the
confidentiality of any information that they communicate in confidence. In
addition, no one is required to communicate information when domestic law
prohibits doing so, or if doing so is incompatible with that country's
important interests.
The seventh aspect of the agreement is its positive comity provision for
competition matters. Positive comity allows one country's competition
officials to request the other country's authorities to investigate suspected
anticompetitive activities occurring in whole or in part in the latter's
territory. Such requests may take place when certain conditions are met: the
requesting country, for example the United States, believes that its interests
are adversely affected and that the activities occurring in Canada are illegal
under Canadian law. The beauty of these arrangements is that, when more
than one country has authority to investigate, a positive comity referral puts
the officials who are closest to the conduct of concern in charge of obtaining
evidence and remedying any anticompetitive conduct. Positive comity
referrals are thus efficient; they eliminate duplicative enforcement efforts,
and decrease concerns about extraterritorial enforcement. The asking country
does not, however, relinquish the right to act if the other country is unwilling
or unable to do so.
III. THE REALITIES OF COOPERATING IN MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Next, I would like to discuss how this cooperation works in practice, first,
on the competition side. It may well be true that unless a merger is of the size
or economic import of a Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, Exxon-Mobil, 3 or
2

See Thomas L. Boeder & Gary J. Dorman, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger:

The Economics, Antitrust Law, and Politics of the Aerospace Industry, 45 ANTITRUST BUL.
119 (2000).
3 See Thaddeus Haddock, Exxon Mobil Raises Estimate of Deal Savings, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 2000, at A4.
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AOL-Time Warner, 4 these transactions may not command the same
headlines as cartel prosecutions. But I am going to focus on mergers with
cross-border effects because for each cartel case on which the United States
and Canada cooperate, we likely have parallel proceedings in half a dozen
mergers. Indeed, at the FTC, the merger wave today means that almost
seventy percent of our professional staff works routinely on mergers, many
of which involve firms, assets, or evidence in Canada.
First, the agencies' staffs may well begin talking to one another as soon
as they see reports about a potential merger in the media. No formal
notification or premerger filing is needed for the agencies to begin sorting
out who has jurisdiction over a transaction. Sometimes, companies'
counselors call to inform us that a deal is in the works. In any event, you
should not expect that your transaction is going to slip by unnoticed.
Increasingly during these initial contacts between the merging parties and
agency staff, the agency will ask whether the parties are notifying other
jurisdictions of the proposed merger. If so, we encourage parties to consider
two things: coordinating the timing of those different reviews and waiving
confidentiality to speed the multiple agency review process and to enhance
the possibility of complementary rather than inconsistent remedies.
Interesting from the U.S. perspective is that, on the one hand, the
confidentiality provisions of our premerger review statute - the Hart-ScottRodino Act (HSR) - prevent disclosure of the fact that parties have made an
HSR filing or the fact that we have issued a second request for additional
information. Thus, we tend not to notify Canada or other foreign authorities
that we are looking at a transaction that affects their important interests at the
time of those particular events, since the notification could be construed as
disclosing that event. On the other hand, our agreement with Canada requires
us to notify it no later than the time when we seek information under the
HSR Act, usually through a second request. Consequently, we tend to notify
the Canadians before issuing the second request in order to improve our
ability to cooperate and, where appropriate, coordinate our investigations.
The information that we share is most accurately defined negatively anything that our laws do not prevent us from sharing. First, we share
information about our respective investigational processes, such as what sort
of documentary or testimonial evidence we will be seeking and from what
sorts of entities, as well as information about our timetables and deadlines.
Second, we share publicly available information about the relevant markets,
applicable legal principles and precedents, and other factors relevant to the
See Heather Fleming Phillips, AOL, Time Warner Dismiss Critics: Rivals Say Merger
Would Limit Counsumer Choices, NAT'L POST, July 28, 2000, at C7.
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analysis, such as the likelihood of entry in particular types of markets and
possible entry barriers.
Third, we share how staffs are analyzing the relevant product and
geographic markets, based on an aggregation of evidence and relevant legal
principles, or discuss tentative theories about competitive effects or
efficiencies. In doing so, we do not share confidential business information
or specific pieces of evidence; that is, we do not disclose nonpublic
commercial information that merging firms or third parties submit to us in
the course of an investigation. Rather, we share what I call agency-generated
confidential information, which is our analytic thinking or attorney work
product, stripped of nonpublic commercial information or trade secrets.
Generally, this type of information is protected from public disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act and privileged from discovery in litigation.
Sharing it with fellow enforcers can be quite helpful, however, and does not
compromise our deliberative or work product privileges. Finally, if aspects of
the merger appear problematic, we exchange information on remedies, such
as whether divestitures, licensing, or behavioral controls will adequately
address competitive concerns.
Given the reality of this cooperation between our competition agencies, I
offer the following advice: In mergers with U.S.-Canadian dimensions, the
merging firms should seriously consider the desirability of voluntarily
providing us the confidential information that they are giving the Canadian
authorities. Indeed, if we know that Canada is reviewing the same matter, we
will routinely ask the parties to provide a copy of the short or long filing
forms that they submitted to the Competition Bureau. While the parties need
not do so, we can always obtain the information in a second request. But if
parties agree to provide both the United States and Canadian authorities with
information to facilitate our communications, investigations can proceed
more efficiently and expeditiously. In some cases, sharing additional
information early obviated the need for a second request for information
from the FTC.
Even when parties have not initially granted general waivers, if both the
United States and Canada find that a matter has problematic aspects, the
firms involved should seriously consider granting waivers of confidentiality
at least with respect to particular documents or information to help resolve
identified anticompetitive concerns efficiently. This is particularly true once
it is recognized that remedial measures are necessary in both our
jurisdictions. Parties should have no illusion that they can cut a deal with one
jurisdiction that limits the ability of the other reviewing jurisdiction to fulfill
its competition responsibilities. Consequently, cooperating with different
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enforcement authorities is far preferable to ending up with conflicting orders
that place the merged firm on the horns of a compliance dilemma.
In several pending cases our staff is in regular contact with the
Competition Bureau to coordinate our parallel investigations. In some of
these cases, the parties granted waivers, which enabled not only the sharing
of confidential information and documents, but a more efficient and focused
discussion of common issues raised by the acquisition in both countries.
Indeed, parties who allow such sharing may well find that an identifiable
portion of the information that they produced for the U.S. authorities fully
meets the needs of the Canadian reviewers, and that duplicative or differing
document searches and productions can largely be avoided.
In two major recent cases, the cooperative process revealed either a
shared U.S.-Canada (or North American) antitrust market or competitive
overlaps of the merging parties' businesses that raised similar
anticompetitive concern in each country's national market. In such cases, one
remedy may cure the problems in both the United States and Canada. Thus,
in both Guinness/GrandMet and Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, the remedies that the
FTC adopted eliminated the need for Canada's Competition Bureau to
impose a separate, arguably duplicative, remedy.
The situation in Holnam/Lafarge was somewhat different - it required
different remedies in the United States and Canada, but cooperation helped to
insure that the remedies were compatible. In that case, Lafarge Corporation,
one of the largest producers of cement, with fourteen plants in the United
States and Canada, sought to acquire a cement plant and related assets of
Holnam, the number one supplier of cement in the United States. As
originally structured the transaction likely would have driven up cement
prices in a geographic market that ranged from Vancouver, British Columbia
to Portland, Oregon. The parties waived confidentiality, thus enabling
Canada's Competition Bureau to send us documents from an earlier
investigation of Lafarge. We also briefed each other on information gathered
from interviews with industry witnesses. With the parties' consent, Canadian
Bureau staff visited our Seattle regional office and reviewed the parties'
responses to our second requests. At the end of this process, the parties
entered a consent with the Commission that eliminated a contract provision
that provided an incentive for Lafarge to limit its cement production at the
Seattle plant it was buying from Holnam. The parties also entered a consent
with Canada's Bureau that called for the divestiture of a cement distribution
terminal in Canada.
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IV. COOPERATION IN COMBATING INTERNET AND
TELEMARKETING FRAUD
I would now like to turn to the FTC's consumer protection mission,
which is broad. It addresses a variety of unfair or deceptive acts and
practices, such as deceptive advertising and credit practices, as well as
telemarketing and Internet fraud. I am going to focus on telemarketing and
Internet fraud, because they illustrate well how U.S. and Canadian enforcers
have used both informal and formal cooperation arrangements to combat
cross-border fraud successfully.
As noted before, scammers are ingenious and often are the first to take
advantage of new technologies that expand the potential victim pool and
make detection and apprehension harder. This occurred both in the areas of
telemarketing and the Internet. In telemarketing, the technological event was
a rapid decrease in long distance phone charges; in Internet fraud, the Net is
the technology. The Internet, in particular, allows a scammer to reach
millions of potential victims worldwide at little or no incremental cost and to
locate itself almost anywhere. Because Internet use is predicted to grow
almost everywhere, the experience Canadian and American law enforcers
have had with fraud on the Net is what most countries likely will face as
millions of their citizens come online in the coming years.
In addition to the basic cooperation agreement I described earlier,
President Clinton and Prime Minister Chr6tien established a U.S.-Canada
Working Group on Telemarketing Fraud in April 1997 and directed it to
report on ways to counter the serious and growing problem of deceptive
cross-border telemarketing. The Working Group's Report, released in
November 1997, recommended expanded cooperation and information
sharing precisely because they allow law enforcement agencies to avoid
duplication of effort and more quickly identify and prosecute ongoing fraud.5
The Report also recognized that different legal standards might interfere with
effective cross-border law enforcement. For example, Canada's legal
standard for extradition was higher than that of the United States, and the
Report accordingly recommended examination and possible modification of
those standards. Since then, Canada has modified its extradition standard to
bring it closer to that of the United States.

See Report of the United States-Canada Working Group on Telemarketing
Fraud,
(visited July 19,2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/uscwgrtf/index.html>.
5
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A. Collecting and Sharing Information
As the Report was being drafted, law enforcement agencies in Canada
and the United States were already working to improve their domestic
consumer complaint databases. In Canada, provincial consumer ministries
and Industry Canada were developing a national consumer complaint
database called CANSHARE, which Canadian agencies could use. In the
United States, the FTC and National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) were developing the Consumer Sentinel database for use by U.S.
and Canadian agencies, subject to confidentiality agreements. The 1997
Report recommended going forward with cross-border shared access
databases.
Today, the Consumer Sentinel database is a joint project of the FTC and
NAAG in cooperation with our Canadian partners, CANSHARE and Project
PhoneBusters. More than 230 law enforcement agencies, including eleven
Canadian agencies, have access to it. The Consumer Sentinel database
provides these law enforcement agencies with secure access via the Net to
about a quarter of a million consumer complaints about telemarketing, direct
mail, and Internet fraud. It can be searched on many fields, including the
name and address of the firm complained about, the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of consumers complaining about that firm, the type of
fraud complained of, and claimed monetary loss.
To give you a sense about what law enforcers can learn from the
database, I am going to share with you some Consumer Sentinel data:
* Source of Complaints for Calendar 1999. The data show that about
72,000 complaints were collected in 1999 by six different sources.
About sixteen percent of them came from PhoneBusters, a Canadian
partner. About twenty-one percent of all complaints were collected
by an Internet complaint form. Each source accepts complaints from
consumers wherever located.
• Claimed Consumer Injury. Consumer Sentinel also captures data
about injury to complaining consumers - the amounts they claim to
have paid to scammers. The data show that the amount of claimed
injury increased substantially between 1995, when total claimed
injury was about twenty-three million dollars, and 1999, when it was
over fifty-two million dollars. These claimed losses certainly
understate total injury, because only a small fraction of injured
consumers actually complain and not all complaining consumers
provide information about how much money they lost.
* Complaint Distribution by Company Location for Calendar
1999. The data relate the number of complaints to the locations of
the complained-about company and complaining consumers. Most
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complaints (about seventy-seven percent) are from U.S. consumers
about U.S. firms. However, a significant proportion of complaints
(about fifteen percent) are about scammers reaching across national
borders. When looked at for a period of years, these data indicate
that scams are becoming increasingly international.
" Internet-Related Complaints as a Percentage of All Complaints.
Internet-related complaints range from ones where the Net was used
only for the initial contact with the consumer to ones where the
entire transaction took place online. Internet-related complaints
increased from about one percent of all complaints in 1996, to about
eleven percent in 1998, to about twenty-two percent in 1999. In
1999, there were 18,622 Internet-related complaints. Clearly, the
Internet is an increasingly important vehicle for fraud.
* Internet Auction Complaints. These data show that a specific type
of Internet-related complaint - Internet auctions - has increased
massively in the last few years. Complaints about Internet auctions
skyrocketed from only about 106 for the last two months of 1997, to
4,407 in 1998, to 10,687 in 1999.
B. Prosecuting Cases Jointly
While more than twenty recent cases involve cross-border fraud, I am
going to talk briefly about two telemarketing cases that particularly illustrate
fraud's international nature as well as the benefits of cooperation among
Canadian and American law enforcers.
The first is an advance fee loan case, Allied CreditReferral Service/Gary
Walton, involving one of many telemarketers operating from British
Columbia that targeted U.S. citizens. Allied Credit in Canada advertised
advance fee loans in newspapers and tabloids in the United States.
Consumers who responded to the ads by calling telemarketers were told they
were certain to be approved for a loan and were asked for an upfront fee.
After receiving the fee, Allied referred the consumers to a "tun-down room"
run by Walton in Arizona, and paid Walton for each referral. Walton then
told each consumer than an unidentified private lender had turned down the
consumer's loan application. Consumers in more than twenty-five states lost
their upfront fees.
Allied, Walton, and thirty-five other advance fee loan scammers were
targeted as part of Project Loan Shark II, a joint operation by U.S. and
Canadian law enforcement agencies. In January, 1998, the British Columbia
Ministry of Attorney General filed against Allied, and the Commission filed
in Arizona against Walton, alleging violations of the FTC Act and the
Telemarketing Sales Rule. The Ministry of Attorney General issued a Cease
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and Desist Order, halting Allied's operations. It also obtained an order
requiring United Parcel Service Canada and Federal Express Canada Ltd. to
hold any packages sent to Allied and to turn the packages over to the
Ministry. This action stopped the flow of consumer upfront fees to Allied.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia later authorized the Ministry to
return these seized checks - totaling about $50,000 - to 140 identified
victims. Walton settled with the Commission in June, 1998. As part of this
settlement, Walton agreed to post a $75,000 performance bond before
entering into services related to the marketing of a credit-related good or
service.
The second case, Win USA, is a lottery case that involved a Canadianbased telemarketing company selling lottery tickets to U.S. residents,
targeting largely senior citizens. It was part of a broader investigation of
cross-border lottery telemarketers organized by the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, the British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, the FTC, and the
Washington State Attorney General's Office. The states of Arizona and
Washington joined the Commission as co-plaintiffs in a federal court case
alleging that the Vancouver telemarketer, Win USA, violated the FTC Act
and Telemarketing Sales Rule, as well as state law. The British Columbia
Ministry of Attorney General filed an action in BC Provincial Court. It
obtained search warrants and an asset freeze as part of the filing; the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police executed the warrants, while the Vancouver
Commercial Crimes Section helped to investigate. In the U.S. case, the court
entered an ex parte TRO, which remains pending.
C. Encouraging Voluntary Compliance
As cross-border fraud is increasingly played out over the Net, the
Commission and its law enforcement partners such as Canada have
developed correspondingly creative ways to address fraud. A prime example
is what we call "Internet surf days" or Internet sweep days. During surf days,
participating agencies surf the Net worldwide for a particular type of scam,
such as false claims about health care products or business opportunities.
Over the last three years, the Commission has led twenty-one international
surf days with more than 250 partners around the world. The Commission
uses surf days to reach new entrepreneurs and alert those who may be
unwittingly violating the law. The results vary by surf day: anywhere from
twenty to seventy percent of the website operators who receive a warning
come into compliance with the law, either by taking down their sites or
modifying their claims or solicitations. Sites that continue to make unlawful
claims are targeted for possible law enforcement action.
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An interesting example is the "International Health Claims Surf Day,"
conducted in late 1998. Participants from eighty agencies in twenty-five
countries, including Canada, found about 1,200 sites with potentially false or
deceptive claims about the treatment, cure, or prevention of six major
diseases - arthritis, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, and multiple
sclerosis. These websites were sent e-mail messages warning them that they
must have reliable scientific evidence backing up their claims. The
Commission also informed the sites that website designers might be liable for
making or disseminating false claims. Based on the surf, the Commission
brought cases "alleging lack of substantiation for various health claims against
several marketers - one promoting a beef tallow derivative claiming to cure
arthritis; another promoting shark cartilage and Cat's Claw, a plant
derivative, each of which were claimed to effectively treat cancer,
HIV/AIDS, and arthritis; and two selling magnetic therapy devices, claiming
to treat certain cancers, high blood pressure, liver disease, and other illnesses.
All the defendants settled.
The most recent surf day, "GetRichQuick.Com," focused on Net-based
get-rich-quick scams, including pyramid schemes, business opportunity and
investment schemes, work-at-home schemes, and deceptive day-trading
schemes. This largest-ever international law enforcement project to fight
Internet fraud involved 150 organizations, including Canadian authorities,
from twenty-eight countries on five continents. The Commission recruited
participants via e-mail from the International Marketing Supervision
Network, composed of member countries from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and Consumers International. In
addition to seven federal and forty-nine state agencies, there were partners
from the U.K. and Norway to Uruguay, Chile, and Korea. As part of
Get.Rich.Quick.Com, surfers from around the world identified about 2,300
suspicious sites, of which about 1,600 received warning e-mails signed by
most of the surf participants.
While information sharing among enforcers is making vast progress and
sharing in particular between CANSHARE, PhoneBusters, and Consumer
Sentinel has greatly increased, there is still much room for improvement. In
both the competition and consumer protection areas, information sharing can
only occur consistent with national laws, which continue, even for very close
neighbors, to limit information sharing. In the United States, for example, the
Commission is prohibited from sharing information obtained by compulsory
process and, to encourage voluntary compliance, the Commission is
prohibited from sharing information obtained voluntarily in lieu of such
process. Similarly, in Canada, Article 29 has at times been cited as barring
the sharing of information with American law enforcement agencies,
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including the Commission. In both circumstances, changing the law or
seeking to harmonize interpretations of the law could increase the extent of
information sharing with obvious law enforcement benefits and no loss of
protection for legitimately confidential business or consumer information.
My real hope is that someday soon Canada will pass a law similar to our
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act and that both countries
will pass laws to enable meaningful information sharing in the consumer
protection area. These laws would allow the United States and Canada to
enter agreements pursuant to which we could each share confidential
information with our foreign partner and use subpoenas and CIDs to gather
evidence for the partner to use in its antitrust or consumer protection cases.
Because our two countries have largely comparable competition, consumer
protection, and confidentiality laws, I cannot think of a more appropriate,
safe, and useful environment in which such sharing could occur.
CONCLUSION
During the past decade as commercial activities have increasingly crossed
borders, we have met the challenge of ensuring that our markets are open and
competitive and that consumers receive accurate, nondeceptive information
by working cooperatively, both formally and informally, with other
enforcers. We could do even more to preserve competitive markets and
protect consumers if law enforcers - with similar laws, similar social and
economic values, and similar concerns for protecting information held by
government - were authorized to share otherwise confidential information
among themselves. I hope that the United States and Canada will set an
example in that effort.

